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INTRODUCTION 
This Comment intends to advance a novel law for prosecuting the theft 
of cryptocurrency—the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (the DTSA or the 
Act). The DTSA is a powerful legal tool for combatting this difficult-to-
define crime. Beyond the conceptual applicability of trade secret law, the 
confidentiality, extraterritoriality, and other uniquely tailored features of the 
Act make it practically useful. This Comment suggests this nonexclusive tool 
for prosecuting cryptocurrency theft and will not explore the many other 
ways that cryptocurrency may be regulated. 
After explaining the technology of cryptocurrency, I will describe the 
growing threat posed by cryptotheft. I will briefly survey the legal tools 
currently used to deal with the theft of cryptocurrency. I will next propose that 
the DTSA should be used to prosecute, both civilly and criminally, the theft of 
blockchain-based currency. The DTSA includes a host of valuable features that 
make it particularly attractive and effective for both the government and 
individuals prosecuting cryptotheft. I will briefly compare the Act to other 
possible schemes for prosecuting cryptotheft. Finally, I will conclude by noting 
the challenge of applying American law to foreign actors and the technical 
difficulty associated with tracking and retrieving digital coins. 
A. Technological Background 
Cryptocurrencies are taking the financial world, and with it the regulatory 
world, by storm.1 These relatively new technologies, many of which are 
described as “decentralized ledger technology” (DLT), revolutionize the way 
both information and money are stored.2 Blockchain technology has formed 
the basis of a new wave of purely digital currency, beginning with the now 
ubiquitous Bitcoin. Like similar blockchain technology, Bitcoin provides “a way 
of recording and reconciling every transaction that has ever occurred, between 
every single participant, going back to the beginning.”3 This technology, while 
 
1 See Kevin Roose, Is There a Cryptocurrency Bubble? Just ask Doge., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/15/business/cryptocurrency-bubble-doge.html 
[http://perma.cc/D5PH-FQYW] (highlighting the “mania” among investors for 
cryptocurrency and describing regulatory responses). 
2 See Rob Marvin, Blockchain: The Invisible Technology That’s Changing the World, PCMAG (Aug. 29, 
2017), https://www.pcmag.com/article/351486/blockchain-the-invisible-technology-thats-changing-the-wor 
[https://perma.cc/59QL-QDLJ] (providing an introduction to the structure and usage of blockchain 
technology). This technology has the potential to radically change how businesses contract and interact 
with each other. See generally Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Comment, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 
166 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (2017) (summarizing and criticizing smart contracts, a key application of 
DLT). Not all cryptocurrencies are DLT, and for a description of the distinction, see infra note 110 
and accompanying text. 
3 Sklaroff, supra note 2, at 269. 
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providing an exciting opportunity for investment, speculation, and innovation, 
also creates many new opportunities for exploitation.4 
Bitcoin has existed since the mysterious Nakamoto paper was published 
in 2009,5 though it is predated by a few lesser-known online currencies with 
similar ledger systems.6 In 2009,  the public began “mining” Bitcoins, a 
process by which new coins are created.7 Mining takes progressively more 
computing power with each new Bitcoin created, with only a finite number 
of possible coins.8 In 2010, 10,000 Bitcoins were exchanged for two pizzas—
the first known sale.9 In 2011, the first rival cryptocurrencies appeared, each 
attempting to offer a subtle but unique advantage, and these rivals have since 
multiplied into the thousands.10 
Bitcoin, as an embodiment of blockchain technology, consists of a “shared 
database populated with entries that must be confirmed and encrypted,” 
much like a shared document with each entry logically connected to every 
entry before.11 This creates a secure log that, in the case of Bitcoin, is stored 
collectively.12 Owners of cryptocurrency do not actually possess their coins, 
 
4 This author is not well suited to describe the technological processes of Bitcoin, but there are a 
plethora of publicly accessible resources that do so quite well. See e.g., SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: 
A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM (2009) (providing a seminal description of Bitcoin and 
the potential of blockchain technology); Nathaniel Popper, What Is Bitcoin, and How Does It Work?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/01/technology/what-is-bitcoin-price.html 
[http://perma.cc/582W-HJA2] (answering commonly asked questions regarding Bitcoin); How Does 
Bitcoin Work?, BITCOIN, https://Bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works [https://perma.cc./9Y2V-HCCK] (last 
visited Aug. 20, 2018) (describing the basic concepts associated with Bitcoin technology). There are 
certain technological differences between major cryptocurrencies, but these differences do not 
undermine the legal analysis. See Arjun Kharpal, All You Need to Know About the Top 5 Cryptocurrencies, 
CNBC (Dec. 14, 2017, 5:28 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/14/Bitcoin-ether-litecoin-ripple-
differences-between-cryptocurrencies.html [https://perma.cc/88MW-P9UV] (describing the 
differences between the top five cryptocurrencies by market capitalization). 
5 See NAKAMOTO, supra note 4. 
6 See Bernard Marr, A Short History Of Bitcoin and Crypto Currency Everyone Should Read, FORBES 
(Dec. 6, 2017, 12:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2017/12/06/a-short-history-of-
bitcoin-and-crypto-currency-everyone-should-read/#7e49051d3f27 [https://perma.cc/ZZC7-8F73] 
(reviewing history of online currencies prior to and following the introduction of Bitcoin). 
7 Id. 
8 For more information on Bitcoin mining, see Bitcoin Mining, BITCOIN.COM, 
https://www.Bitcoin.com/Bitcoin-mining [https://perma.cc/4CMS-AV9S] (last visited Apr. 17, 2018). 
9 See Marr, supra note 6. The value as of September 21, 2018 of this much Bitcoin is $67,290,300. 
See Bitcoin, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/ (last visited Sept. 21, 
2018) (listing Bitcoin price at $6,729.03). 
10 See Marr, supra note 6 (describing emergence of Namecoin and Litecoin). 
11 Andrew Meola, Understanding Blockchain Technology, Bitcoins and the Rise of Cryptocurrency, 
BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 25, 2017, 4:36 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/blockchain-technology-
cryptocurrency-explained-2017-8 [https://perma.cc/DU5U-HYCY]. 
12 For information on the security of blockchain, see Allison Berke, How Safe Are Blockchains? 
It Depends., HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 7, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/how-safe-are-blockchains-it-
depends [https://perma.cc/4FR8-Z6VD]. 
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which are stored in the blockchain—the agnostic public registry of all 
transactions. To designate ownership, Bitcoin owners rely on public and 
private keys: the public key is used to receive Bitcoin and can be safely 
published anywhere, while the private key is used to send Bitcoin and must 
be secured and protected.13 Both keys allow users to access their portion of 
the blockchain, and are stored in one’s digital wallet.14 This information can 
be stored using a web-based (hot) wallet, or when large cryptocurrency values 
are at stake, in a more secure offline (cold) wallet such as a USB drive.15 
B. The Growing Problem of Cryptotheft 
Hackers targeting cryptocurrency have stolen massive sums of money, and 
these heists are only growing larger. In January of 2018, 500 million XEM (a 
blockchain-based currency)—worth $533 million—were lifted from a 
Japanese cryptocurrency exchange.16 This was just one of “[a]t least three 
dozen heists on cryptocurrency exchanges since 2011” with over 980,000 
Bitcoins stolen and few recovered.17 The largest prior cryptoheist caused the 
bankruptcy of Mt. Gox, a Tokyo-based exchange, and led to an international 
collapse of cryptocurrency prices.18 The 2018 XEM theft hardly impacted the 
cryptocurrency market—a statement of the world’s increasing dependence on 
cryptocurrency. Given that cryptocurrencies are here to stay, it is concerning 
that “[h]ackers have compromised more than 14% of the Bitcoin and ether 
supply,” and that “crypto hacking is a $200-million annual revenue industry.”19 
This form of crime has cost companies and governments $11.3 billion in 
illegitimate transactions and lost tax revenue.20 
Hackers not only target individuals and exchanges that hold Bitcoin, but 
they go after cryptocurrencies before the coins even reach the public, stealing 
 
13 See Fred M., Bitcoin Wallets Explained: How to Choose the Best Wallet for You, ASIC NEWS 
(Nov. 14, 2017), https://asicnews.com/guides/Bitcoin-wallets-explained-choose-best-wallet/ 
[https://perma.cc/G9W3-TLJ4].  
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Henry Kenyon, More Than $500 Million Stolen in Japanese Cryptocurrency Heist, CONG. Q. 
ROLL CALL (Jan. 29, 2018), 2018 WL 578949. 
17 Jemima Kelly & Tommy Wilkes, Exclusive: Coincheck Hackers Trying to Move Stolen 
Cryptocurrency – Executive, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2018, 8:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
japan-cryptocurrency-cybercrime/exclusive-coincheck-hackers-trying-to-move-stolen-
cryptocurrency-executive-idUSKBN1FJ28Y [https://perma.cc/ZG2L-GSD5]. 
18 Id. 
19 Olga Kharif, Hackers Have Stolen About 14% of Big Digital Currencies, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 18, 
2018, 11:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-bitcoin-stolen-hackers-20180118-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/A43N-7XDC]. 
20 Id. 
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directly from Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs).21 This can be done via “denial of 
service attacks, hacking web applications and exchanges, and breaching the 
accounts of people linked to companies running the ICOs.”22 And while 
American policing authorities have responded lethargically to this growing 
body of cryptothreats, private institutions are beginning to fill the void. For 
instance, “[m]ajor global insurers are starting to offer protection against 
cryptocurrency theft.”23 This is no light task for insurance companies: “the 
challenge is how to cover those risks for customers they know little about, 
who use technology few understand and represent a young industry that lacks 
troves of data insurers usually rely on in designing and pricing coverage.”24 
C. Forays into Criminal and Civil Prosecution 
Because cryptocurrency theft involves the unauthorized discovery of an 
owner’s private key, it is difficult to legally characterize as theft. The private 
key itself has no value, beyond unlocking access to however many Bitcoins 
the owner may possess under that key. Law enforcement has been 
demonstrably skeptical of pursuing investigations of cryptotheft, likely in 
part because Bitcoin is not by definition currency25 and its theft does not fit 
into a neat legal box.26 In one report from 2011, the FBI referred to a hacked 
and pilfered cryptocurrency platform as an alleged “computer intrusion,” 
rather than theft.27 There have been multiple instances of FBI investigations, 
but it is unclear if the investigators take this form of crime seriously.28 The 
 
21 See Henry Kenyon, Report: Hackers Target Cryptocurrency Funding Efforts, CONG. Q. ROLL 
CALL (Jan. 23, 2018), 2018 WL 506079 (describing the rise of cybercriminal efforts targeting ICOs). 
22 Id. 
23 Suzanne Barlyn, Insurers Gingerly Test Bitcoin Business with Heist Policies, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 
2018, 1:13 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-markets-Bitcoin-insurance-insight/insurers-
gingerly-test-Bitcoin-business-with-heist-policies-idUSKBN1FL406 [https://perma.cc/F2R4-XQWN] 
(explaining that insurers spend more time reviewing potential clients involved in the cryptomarket). 
24 Id. This is an extensive process that involves scrutinizing the client’s storage, security, scale, 
and even employees. Id. 
25 See John Kelleher, Why Do Bitcoins Have Value?, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 7, 2018, 1:50 
PM), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/100314/why-do-Bitcoins-have-value.asp 
[https://perma.cc/8F5M-FNS9] (offering a model that values bitcoin both as currency and 
as a store of value). 
26 See Jason Leopold, If Your Bitcoins Are Stolen in a Major Hack, Will the FBI Help?, VICE (Feb. 
9, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ypnn3g/if-your-Bitcoins-are-stolen-in-a-
major-hack-will-the-fbi-help-v24n1 [https://perma.cc/3D9W-LTTM] (detailing the lack of an 
effective FBI response to an incident of cryptocurrency theft via hacking). 
27 Id. 
28 See, e.g., Stan Higgins, The FBI is Investigating a $1.3 Million Bitcoin Theft, COINDESK 
(Oct. 6, 2016, 9:05 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/the-fbi-is-investigating-a-1-3-million-
Bitcoin-theft/ [https://perma.cc/B24B-JHG5] (describing pending investigation into computer 
intrusion, but noting that the “status of the investigation and the extent to which the FBI has 
pursued the lead remains unknown”). 
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FBI has shown more willingness to pursue action against those who 
redistribute Bitcoin without a license to do so,29 or against those who employ 
ransomware to remotely lock computers.30 The FBI and other relevant 
authorities should and likely will pay increasing attention to cryptotheft. In 
support of increased prioritization, a report from President Obama’s 
Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity found that “we must move 
the responsibility for (or burden of) cybersecurity away from individual 
enterprises and citizens, and handle it at higher levels for everyone’s benefit.”31 
Criminal actions have only tangentially circled the field of cryptotheft. 
For example, in January of 2018, a federal prosecutor brought criminal charges 
of wire fraud against a Chicago trader who allegedly stole $2 million worth of 
his firm’s cryptocurrency holdings for personal use.32 He then lied to the 
firm’s management about the location of the company’s cryptocurrency and 
his own trading.33 Although this was one of the first known instances of direct 
federal prosecution of cryptocurrency theft, it seems more closely aligned 
with prosecutions of corporate misappropriation. In a similar 2018 case, the 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission pressed charges against a 
defendant corporation for “misappropriating over $6 million from at least 
twenty-eight customers by transferring customer funds into personal bank 
accounts, and using those funds for personal expenses and the purchase of 
luxury goods.”34 The case was about misrepresentation, consumer abuse, and 
unfair practices, not theft. These examples fit a trend among known 
prosecutions: none embody the paradigmatic case of cryptotheft 
characterized by offsite hacking by a third party with the goal of obtaining 
access to an entity’s wallet to steal its private key and designate new 
ownership of its cryptocurrency. There is an ever-growing need to prosecute 
the direct theft of cryptocurrency, as thieves have gone so far as to engage in 
home invasions in pursuit of cryptoassets. For example, in Britain, armed 
 
29 See, e.g., Virtual Ticket to Prison: Investigation of Fraud Scheme Unravels Man’s Illegal Bitcoin 
Exchange, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (May 3, 2017), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/fraud-
scheme-leads-to-illegal-bitcoin-exchange [https://perma.cc/68Y3-R5RN] (detailing the FBI’s arrest 
of Daniel Mercede for redistribution of bitcoin without a license). 
30 See Michael del Castillo, To Catch a Ransomer: How the FBI Chases Crime on the Blockchain, 
COINDESK (Feb. 1, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/catch-Bitcoin-ransomer-inside-fbis-
cyber-investigation-process/ [https://perma.cc/3N8V-4WGL] (providing an overview of an FBI 
agent’s approach to identifying and pursuing criminals using cryptocurrency ransomware). 
31 David N. Lawrence et al., Special Comment, It’s the Cyber Crime and Its Sponsors (Not My 
Cyber-Security), Stupid, 5 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 1, 15 (2017). 
32 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois, Chicago Trader 
Facing Federal Fraud Charge for Allegedly Misappropriating $2 Million in Cryptocurrencies (Feb. 
15, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/pr/chicago-trader-facing-federal-fraud-charge-
allegedly-misappropriating-2-million [https://perma.cc/P3RK-R6EJ]. 
33 Id. 
34 COMMODITY FUTURES L. REP. 1057 (Feb. 13, 2018), 2018 WL 817353. 
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men broke into the home of a cryptotrader and forced him at gunpoint to 
transfer his assets.35 
Federal prosecutors recently brought charges of “operation of an 
unlicensed money service business,” “conspiracy to commit money 
laundering,” “money laundering,” and “engaging in unlawful monetary 
transactions” against a Russian national, Alexander Vinnik.36 Vinnik 
operated a Bitcoin currency exchange, known for illicit dealings, which 
helped launder Bitcoin stolen from Mt. Gox.37 Despite a competing 
extradition request from Russia, Vinnik will face trial in the United 
States.38 As evidenced by the charges, Vinnik’s prosecution turns on his 
conversion of illicit Bitcoin into official currency—not the actual theft of 
the Bitcoin—demonstrating the limits of current legal theories. 
Victims of cryptotheft have limited civil recourse. In a rare example of 
a civil suit, a Sprint customer sued the phone company after his phone 
was hacked and $360 million worth of cryptocurrency was stolen as a 
result.39 The plaintiff asserted that Sprint made representations of 
cybersecurity, did not live up to its promises, and did not respond to his 
requests to freeze his account.40 The complaint asserted negligence, breach 
of contract, breach of confidentiality, and violations of California’s unfair 
competition and customer records laws.41 While these assertions are 
certainly civil tools that victims of cryptocurrency theft may use to obtain 
compensation, they involve indirect and uphill battles that fail to hold the 
direct perpetrators accountable, facilitate increased damages, or impose 
criminal penalties. 
An indicative incident of cryptotheft is seen in Bittrex, Inc. v. Muller, 
an arbitration over domain name trademark infringement. The defendant 
 
35 See Maev Kennedy, Cryptocurrency Trader ‘Forced at Gunpoint to Make Bitcoin Transfer’, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 28, 2018, 12:47 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jan/28/cryptocurrency-
trader-forced-at-gunpoint-to-make-bitcoin-transfer [https://perma.cc/X46Z-YU8J]. 
36 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California, Russian 
National And Bitcoin Exchange Charged In 21-Count Indictment for Operating Alleged 
International Money Laundering Scheme and Allegedly Laundering Funds from Hack of Mt. Gox 
(July 26, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/russian-national-and-bitcoin-exchange-
charged-21-count-indictment-operating-alleged [https://perma.cc/5PPE-MRWH]. 
37 Id. 
38 See Greek Top Court Clears Way for U.S. Extradition of Russian Cybercrime Suspect, REUTERS (Dec. 
13, 2017, 7:34 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-russia-extradition/greek-top-court-clears-
way-for-u-s-extradition-of-russian-cybercrime-suspect-idUSKBN1E71K7 [https://perma.cc/63NG-
HJV7] (detailing Vinnik’s extradition to the United States, rather than to Russia). 
39 Dave Embree, Sprint Negligently Failed to Protect Phone from Hackers, Suit Says, WESTLAW 
DATA PRIVACY DAILY BRIEFING (Dec. 27, 2017), 2017 WL 6601899. 
40 Complaint at ¶¶ 4-5, McCarthy v. Sprint Corp., No. 2:17-09116, 2017 WL 6520978 (C.D. 
Cal. Dec. 20, 2017). 
41 Id. at ¶¶ 35, 51, 63, 72, 80, 86. 
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used domain names “to impersonate [the] Complainant in order to 
fraudulently obtain [the] Complainant customers’ user identification and 
password credentials and steal from their cryptocurrency accounts.”42 The 
victims’ only recourse, the seizure of the stolen domain name, did little to 
remedy the cryptotheft they suffered. 
While the first civil and criminal prosecutions have tangentially dealt with 
cryptotheft, the core threat remains unaddressed. One of the primary reasons 
authorities have not prosecuted offsite cryptotheft is the mistaken belief that 
federal laws do not adequately cover this form of crime.43 Significantly, “law 
enforcement agencies remain undecided as to whether or not stealing digital 
currency constitutes a crime.”44 
I. APPLYING THE DTSA 
The DTSA was signed into law by President Obama on May 11, 2016, 
after moving through Congress remarkably quickly and with bipartisan 
support.45 In his remarks, Obama noted that “one of the biggest advantages 
that we’ve got in this global economy is that we innovate, we come up with 
new services, new goods, new products, new technologies” and that the Act 
would protect against the theft of these assets.46 At the time it was passed, 
the DTSA was called the “most significant expansion of federal law in 
intellectual property since the Lanham Act in 1946,” but its practical impact 
has been limited.47 This Act is the perfect tool for prosecuting cryptotheft 
both civilly and criminally. 
 
42 Bittrex, Inc. v. Muller, FA1801001768933, 2018 WL 1284549 at *2 (UDRP-ARB Feb. 26, 2018). 
43 Certain states have redefined currency to include cryptocurrency, or are considering doing so, 
which may provide prosecutors a legal vehicle to pursue individuals engaged in cryptotheft. See Leyla 
Amur, CSI Crypto: Can Victims Recover Stolen Coin?, BRAVE NEW COIN (Oct. 13, 2017), 
https://bravenewcoin.com/news/csi-crypto-can-victims-recover-stolen-coin/ [https://perma.cc/SQ3D-
8UXL] (listing states that have broadened their definitions of currency to include cryptocurrency). 
44 Id. 
45 See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President 
at Signing of S. 1890—Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (May 11, 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/11/remarks-president-signing-s-1890-
defend-trade-secrets-act-2016 [https://perma.cc/7ESC-5GZ6] (“What these members of Congress 
have done is to, on a bipartisan basis, pass a strong enforcement bill that allows us not only to go after 
folks who are stealing trade secrets through criminal actions, but also through civil actions, and hurt 
them where it counts in their pocketbook.”). 
46 Id. 
47 Bradford K. Newman et al., The Defend Trade Secrets Act: One Year Later, BUS. L. 
TODAY (Apr. 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2017/04/02_newman.html 
[https://perma.cc/X39L-926C]. 
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A. Is Cryptocurrency Really a Trade Secret? 
According to the DTSA, located within the Economic Espionage Act (EEA): 
[T]he term “trade secret” means all forms and types of financial, business, 
scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including 
patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, 
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, whether 
tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or memorialized 
physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if— 
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such 
information secret; and 
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable through proper means by, another person who can obtain 
economic value from the disclosure or use of the information . . . .48 
 
The answer to this question—whether cryptocurrency is really a trade 
secret—is, quite simply, yes. The owner’s use of a private key to send currency 
meets multiple paths to eligibility under this expansive definition. The 
technical information (the key), in combination with a publicly stored ledger 
that is intangible and stored electronically, is kept secret by one’s digital wallet 
or by a public exchange, and derives very significant economic value from its 
not being known nor being readily ascertainable by proper means. 
Perhaps the strongest counterargument to this description of 
cryptocurrency is the complete publicity of the blockchain ledger. However, 
it is the secrecy of the key necessary to designate ownership of the coin that 
creates the value, in combination with the public information. The Ninth 
Circuit, when construing the EEA, wrote: 
[A] trade secret may consist of a compilation of data, public sources or a 
combination of proprietary and public sources. It is well recognized that “it 
is the secrecy of the claimed trade secret as a whole that is determinative. The 
fact that some or all of the components of the trade secret are well-known 
does not preclude protection for a secret combination, compilation, or 
integration of the individual elements.49 
 
Thus, the trade secret is not the coin itself, but the ability to send the coin 
via a private key. The trade secret definition is flexible enough to escape the 
 
48 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (3) (2016). 
49 United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (1995)), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 314 (2017). 
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pitfalls of laws designed to target standard theft. The similarly expansive 
definition of “misappropriation” under the DTSA encapsulates the many 
ways in which crypto-owners’ assets could be hacked or taken.50 In fact, the 
statute expressly defines “improper means” as including “espionage through 
electronic or other means.”51 
B. Benefits of the DTSA Structure 
The DTSA creates a comprehensive scheme, authorizing both civil and 
criminal penalties for the misappropriation of trade secrets. Beyond the 
penalty structures, the Act includes provisions that uniquely address many of 
the problems inherent in prosecuting theft of cryptocurrency. These 
provisions allow for speedy and private ex parte seizure of stolen assets, protect 
the confidentiality of the trade secret and ancillary information, and incent 
strong cybersecurity practices by cryptocurrency owners. This structure is 
both practically and conceptually preferable to other legal schemes. 
1. Criminal and Civil Liability 
Criminally, the DTSA provides a neat, effective, and on-point tool for 
federal prosecutors to use when tracking hackers. Civilly, entities are given 
the opportunity to directly pursue the perpetrator, and to seek enhanced 
relief. This is not necessarily the case under any other scheme because of the 
unique technical configuration of cryptocurrency. 
It is a crime to steal, misappropriate, or without authorization obtain a 
trade secret, with intent or knowledge that doing so will injure the owner.52 
The Act also covers attempt or conspiracy to commit such theft. The culprit 
shall be imprisoned for up to ten years or “fined not more than the greater of 
$5,000,000 or three times the value of the stolen trade secret to the 
organization, including expenses for research and design and other costs of 
reproducing the trade secret that the organization has thereby avoided.”53 As 
a result of these forceful punishments, the DTSA could be used to deter 
cryptotheft. Importantly, it includes the cost of reproducing the trade secret, 
allowing the government to account for the substantial expenses a victim has 
taken to mine and protect the cryptocurrency. 
Similarly, an “owner of a trade secret that is misappropriated may bring a 
civil action under this subsection if the trade secret is related to a product or 
 
50 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (5) (2016) (expanding the scope of “misappropriation” to cover a wide 
array of possible intentional or knowing trade secret disclosures and uses). 
51 Id. § 1839 (6). 
52 Id. § 1832 (a)(1). 
53 Id. § 1832 (a)–(b). 
2018] Prosecuting Cryptocurrency Theft 249 
service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.”54 
Cryptocurrencies are thus subject to regulation because coin ownership is 
exchanged both between states and between countries. Once a trade secret is 
part of interstate trade, the statute provides for civil seizure, injunctive relief, 
damages for the actual loss, unjust enrichment, or the creation of liability to 
third parties.55 Furthermore, “if the trade secret is willfully and maliciously 
misappropriated,” which would almost always be the case in cryptotheft, the 
court may “award exemplary damages in an amount not more than 2 times 
the amount of the damages . . . .”56 
2. Ex Parte Seizures 
One of the most pressing problems plaguing cryptotheft is the rapid 
dispersal of assets once stolen. This is evident from the XEM heist,57 where 
authorities have only been able to identify these coins after layers of selloffs. 
The DTSA addresses the possibility of a redistribution of stolen coin by 
incorporating an ex parte seizure provision, when such a procedure is 
“necessary to prevent the propagation or dissemination of the trade secret 
that is the subject of the action.”58 This provision allows for the immediate 
and completely confidential court-ordered seizure of assets. 
To apply for the order, the moving party must first show that an order 
under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be inadequate.59 
Rule 65 describes the power to grant preliminary injunctions and temporary 
restraining orders.60 This is almost always true in cases of cryptotheft, because 
the thief would be found likely to “evade, avoid, or otherwise not comply with 
such an order.”61 Second, the movant must show that “an immediate and 
irreparable injury will occur” without seizure.62 This is also probable given 
the ability to rapidly sell, hide, or disseminate cryptocurrency. Third, the 
weighing of harms must favor the movant over the legitimate interests of the 
person from whom it is seized and must “substantially outweigh” the harm to 
third parties.63 This balancing of equities may become a problem after the 
coin has been sold without knowledge by the buyer, but if done early enough 
the balancing will clearly favor the movant. Fourth, the movant must be likely 
 
54 Id. § 1836 (b)(1) (emphasis added). 
55 Id. § 1836 (b)(3)(B). 
56 Id. § 1836 (b)(3)(C). 
57 See supra text accompanying notes 16–17. 
58 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (b)(2)(A)(i) (2016). 
59 Id. § 1836 (b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). 
60 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)–(b) (defining standards for issuance of injunctions and restraining orders). 
61 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2016). 
62 Id. § 1836 (b)(2)(A)(ii)(II). 
63 Id. § 1836 (b)(2)(A)(ii)(III). 
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to succeed on the merits, showing that the person against whom seizure is 
ordered misappropriated an actual trade secret by improper means.64 In a 
quintessential case of hacking, this will not be hard to demonstrate. Fifth, the 
person must have actual possession of the trade secret.65 This is likely to be 
the case if the order is granted immediately after the theft but may prove 
technically difficult. Sixth, the movant must describe “with reasonable 
particularity the matter to be seized and, to the extent reasonable under the 
circumstances, identif[y] the location where the matter is to be seized  . . . .”66 
This requirement will present the largest obstacle, given the practical 
difficulties in identifying the cyber location of the cryptothief. Still, it is likely 
that the circumstantial difficulty of providing a precise location will allow the 
court to still issue the order. Seventh, notice must make it likely that the 
stolen property would be destroyed, moved, hidden, or made inaccessible.67 
This is highly probable given the capacity to redistribute cryptocurrency. 
Lastly, the applicant cannot publicize the requested seizure.68 
This ex parte seizure procedure provides cryptocurrency owners with an 
incredibly powerful and unique tool to recover their stolen coins. While 
practical difficulties remain, this provision puts the owner in the best legal 
position to recover the stolen coins, rather than forcing him or her to sue for 
replacement cost. A damages suit is likely to be particularly problematic due 
to the possibility of judgment-proof defendants. 
3. Confidentiality 
The Act provides for the protection of confidentiality in two important 
regards. First, in ex parte seizure proceedings the thief is shielded from any 
knowledge of the proceedings. Second, the contents of and information 
peripheral to the trade secret are protected throughout and beyond the 
litigation.69 This protects the secrecy of the private key as well as other 
confidential information, potentially including the number of assets lost or the 
identity of the owner, so that the owner does not become a target of future heists. 
The ex parte seizure procedure includes inherent confidentiality 
protections against any form of publicity, especially to the perpetrator. This 
confidentiality prevents the moving, hiding, or transferring of stolen 
cryptoassets. It also protects the victim from harms related to publicity.70 
 
64 Id. § 1836 (b)(2)(A)(ii)(IV). 
65 Id. § 1836 (b)(2)(A)(ii)(V). 
66 Id. § 1836 (b)(2)(A)(ii)(VI). 
67 Id. § 1836 (b)(2)(A)(ii)(VII). 
68 Id. § 1836 (b)(2)(A)(ii)(VIII). 
69 See infra text accompanying notes 72–75. 
70 See, e.g., At the End of Your Tether: Addressing, Responding to and Insuring Cryptocurrency Theft, 
REEDSMITH (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2017/12/addressing-
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There is risk to alerting the public of possession of significant cryptoassets. 
Cryptothieves have been known to go so far as home invasion to steal coins, 
and a public statement of ownership invites targeting by bad actors.71 
Publicity would also cause public relations and reputational harm to 
individuals and groups responsible for protecting the cryptoassets of others. 
This legal tool is therefore an attractive option for an entity who may waver 
on pursuing legal action without the guarantee of confidentiality. While this 
complete confidentiality may not always extend to the later stages of 
litigation, ideally the assets can be returned via an ex parte seizure before the 
public is aware that anything occurred. 
Second, the trade secret and related information are protected by 
“[o]rders to preserve confidentiality.”72 Under this provision, “the court shall 
enter such orders and take such other action as may be necessary and 
appropriate to preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets.”73 This protection 
is likely expansive enough to cover more than just the private key; it may also 
protect the number of assets, the type of asset, where and how the assets are 
stored, and any other information the owner feels worthy of protection. The 
Act holds that “[t]he court may not authorize or direct the disclosure of any 
information the owner asserts to be a trade secret unless the court allows the 
owner the opportunity to file a submission under seal that describes the 
interest of the owner in keeping the information confidential.”74 This means 
that even as the suit progresses, a party will be able to maintain expansive 
public-facing confidentiality. Further, the Act mandates specific technical 
procedures be followed regarding the protection of confidentiality, including 
the appointment of a special master bound by a nondisclosure agreement and 
the possibility of encrypting stored materials.75 This generous confidentiality 
protection is an incredibly valuable tool for parties afraid of inviting attacks 
or staining a public image of cybersecurity. 
 
responding-to-and-insuring-cryptocurrency-theft [https://perma.cc/FW72-5M86] (“The Tether 
hack illuminates the privacy, reputational, financial and recovery risks associated with issuing, 
owning and storing digital currencies.”). 
71 See Cryptocurrency Theft Presents New Challenge for Law Enforcement, ORGANIZED CRIME AND 
CORRUPTION REPORTING PROJECT (Feb. 21, 2018, 4:07 PM), https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/7679-
cryptocurrency-theft-presents-new-challenge-for-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/7PNG-GHBS] 
(“Crypto celebrities are becoming red hot targets as criminals begin to realize that they’re more 
likely to score a huge payday by extorting someone with crypto assets than they are someone with 
more traditional assets that are illiquid . . . .”).  
72 18 U.S.C. § 1835(a) (2016). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. § 1835(b). 
75 Id. § 1836 (b)(2)(D), (H). 
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4. Cybersecurity as a Prerequisite to Civil Protection 
If the United States government is to expend resources in the civil 
protection of cryptoassets, it should encourage robust private 
cybersecurity. Inherent in the private enforcement of trade secret 
misappropriation is the requirement that the plaintiff had reasonable 
security measures in place to protect the confidentiality of the secret.76 In 
this case, that would include protecting, at the very least, the private key. 
The DTSA furthers this priority by incorporating longstanding trade 
secret law, which requires reasonable security measures.77 This standard of 
reasonableness should and likely would vary based on the value of the 
assets stored. Owners would be expected to protect their assets to a degree 
commensurate with the assets held. 
No court has ruled on what would constitute statutorily sufficient 
cryptocurrency protection, and the answer would likely be situation 
specific.78 However, many commentators have described best practices for 
protecting one’s cryptoassets, and these can easily be extrapolated to legal 
requirements for trade secret protection. For instance, a firm trading in 
cryptocurrency should (1) “[n]ever transmit keys electronically;” (2) “[l]imit 
trading authorization” to only necessary employees; and (3) “[m]anage keys 
with a secure electronic wallet.”79 These suggestions may go beyond or fall 
short of what would be statutorily required, but they still constitute good 
advice for companies seeking to be certain of legal protection. 
An important cybersecurity decision for courts is whether to require 
plaintiffs to store assets in a hot or cold wallet. The simplest definition of a 
hot wallet is one connected to the internet, while a cold wallet is one that is 
disconnected from the internet.80 Cold wallets are much less convenient, 
but much more secure. Standard advice calls for storing the majority of 
 
76 See Michelle L. Evans, Proof of Facts to Establish Information as Trade Secret Under Restatement 
of Torts, 134 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 321, § 8 (2018) (“The greater number of measures used 
by the trade secret owner to guard the secrecy of company information, the greater likelihood the 
information will be treated as a trade secret. If the company does not provide sufficient security 
measures for its information, the information will not be given trade secret status.”). 
77 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2016). 
78 One could expect a different degree of protection reasonable for a cryptocurrency 
exchange with cryptoassets worth billions of dollars, compared to an individual holding a few 
thousand dollars’ worth of Bitcoin. 
79 Edmund Mokhtarian & Alexander Lindgren, Rise of the Crypto Hedge Fund: Operational Issues 
and Best Practices for an Emergent Investment Industry, 23 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 112, 155-56 (2018). 
These authors suggest a wallet capable of “sweeping.” This means that the wallet, when “importing 
. . . private keys ‘sweeps,’ or generates a new transaction on the applicable blockchains and, in turn, 
creates new private keys that are then available only inside of that wallet.” Id. at 156. 
80 Leah Stella Stephens, Cold Wallet vs. Hot Wallet: What’s the Difference?, MEDIUM (Apr. 9, 2017), 
https://medium.com/dash-for-newbies/cold-wallet-vs-hot-wallet-whats-the-difference-a00d872aa6b1 
[https://perma.cc/4GD8-LCFR]. 
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one’s funds in a cold wallet and a few funds that are actively traded in a hot 
wallet.81 This puts as little coinage at risk as possible. This practical advice 
would likely inform trade secret protection, though it would vary based on 
the owner’s circumstances. Most hot wallets have robust cybersecurity 
protection, so a small-scale cryptotrader would likely be protected even if 
all of his assets were stored hot. However, a large-scale trader, trading firm, 
or public exchange may be deemed unreasonable for storing all or most of 
their assets in a hot wallet, when it would be relatively economical to 
implement a majority cold-storage system. Regardless of where the court 
draws the line, parties would be incentivized to implement a safe but 
economically reasonable cybersecurity mechanism. 
C. Superiority of the DTSA over Other Legal Schemes 
While this Comment does not argue that the DTSA is the only legal 
scheme that could plausibly be used to prosecute the theft of cryptocurrency, 
it does contend that it is both practically and theoretically preferable to other 
options. Practically, no other scheme includes the built-in confidentiality, 
seizure, and cybersecurity elements of the DTSA. Furthermore, the DTSA 
is one of very few avenues for private federal civil suit. Theoretically, while a 
competing “property” conceptualization of the private key has a degree of 
persuasiveness, this characterization does not account for what is actually 
stolen, which is not the physical possession of a key or even the Bitcoin, but 
the ability to label a portion of a public ledger. For these reasons, the theft of 
cryptocurrency is best described as intellectual property misappropriation.82 
Civilly, plaintiffs may have the option of bringing a state claim, and some 
states have even begun statutorily labeling cryptocurrency as currency for 
certain purposes.83 In the prototypical case of cryptotheft, because the 
 
81 Id. 
82 The Commodities Futures Trading Commission has classified Bitcoin as a commodity, while 
the Securities Exchange Commission has taken steps to treat it as a security. See Jacob J, US 
Regulators Debate Whether Bitcoin is Commodity or Security, COINTELEGRAPH (Oct. 19, 2017), 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/us-regulators-debate-whether-Bitcoin-is-commodity-or-security 
[https://perma.cc/6ATR-HZ4Z] (detailing the debate over proper classification of digital 
currencies); see also Public Statement, Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11 [https://perma.cc/7YXZ-
WSWK] (“It has been asserted that cryptocurrencies are not securities and that the offer and sale of 
cryptocurrencies are beyond the SEC’s jurisdiction. Whether that assertion proves correct with 
respect to any digital asset that is labeled as a cryptocurrency will depend on the characteristics and 
use of that particular asset.”). This Comment does not weigh in on the debate, nor does it believe that 
its advocacy for criminal and civil DTSA prosecution affects either proposed regulatory classification. 
83 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 61-15-1(3) (2017) (defining cryptocurrency, in the context of money 
laundering, as “digital currency in which encryption techniques are used to regulate the generation of 
units of currency and verify the transfer of funds, and which operate independently of a central bank”). 
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defendant is foreign, diversity jurisdiction in federal court may be proper over 
such a state claim. However, it is improbable that any state has a scheme 
covering a comparable scope of cryptotheft as the DTSA, and even less 
probable that these schemes would include the private seizure, confidentiality, 
and requisite cybersecurity of the DTSA. 
In the federal context, as courts have described, cryptocurrency cannot be 
easily defined as official currency. For instance, in United States v. Petix84 the 
“Government’s theory of prosecution require[d] treating Bitcoin as money in 
the ordinary understanding of that term. Because Bitcoin does not fit an 
ordinary understanding of the term ‘money,’ Petix cannot have violated 
Section 196085 in its current form.”86 This district court described Bitcoin as 
analogous to “marbles, Beanie Babies™, or Pokémon™ trading cards [in that] 
bitcoins have value exclusively to the extent that people at any given time 
choose privately to assign them value.”87 While this is an incomplete 
comparison, it demonstrates well the lack of inherent value to cryptocurrency. 
Wire Fraud offers one of the best alternatives for federal criminal 
prosecution.88 Under this statute, it is a crime  
to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or 
property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire . . . in 
interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or 
sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice . . . .89 
This definition would likely cover most instances of cryptotheft, but only 
if cryptocurrency can be defined as property.90 Defining Bitcoin as property 
is a contentious issue that makes this statute difficult to apply.91 
 
84 No. 15-227A, 2016 WL 7017919 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2016).  
85 See 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2016) (describing the “[p]rohibition of unlicensed money 
transmitting businesses”). 
86 Petrix, 2016 WL 7017919, at *6. But see Memorandum Opinion Regarding the Court’s Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction at 3, SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-416 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013) (“[Bitcoin] can also 
be exchanged for conventional currencies, such as the U.S. dollar, Euro, Yen, and Yuan. Therefore, 
Bitcoin is a currency or form of money, and investors wishing to invest in [Bitcoin Savings and 
Trust] provided an investment of money.”). 
87 Petix, 2016 WL 7017919, at *5-6. 
88 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). 
89 Id. 
90 It should be noted that the stolen coin could be labeled an “honest service” under the Wire 
Fraud statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012) (“For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or 
artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest 
services.”). This interpretation would likely stretch the intent of this statutory expansion. 
91 See generally Kelvin FK Low & Ernie GS Teo, Bitcoins & Other Cryptocurrencies as Property?, 
9 LAW INNOV. & TECH. 235, 245-54 (2017) (discussing how attempts at defining Bitcoin as property 
are challenged by the intangible nature of Bitcoin and the presumption of the law against 
conceptualizing confidential information, such as cryptographic keys, as property). 
2018] Prosecuting Cryptocurrency Theft 255 
Alternatively, the private key itself could be described as the property 
being defrauded. This conception, while more plausible, suffers at a theoretical 
level in two primary ways. First, the private key on its own has no value. 
Second, the key is not an entity unto itself, but the embodiment of the 
capability to perform a specific action. It therefore takes the form its owner 
desires. The key could even consist of an ever-changing output of a random 
sequence generator. The private key is therefore only a representation of the 
ability to designate new ownership of a publicly viewable cryptocoin, and such 
a power is wholly intangible. While stealing a complex physical or even digital 
key and using it to break into a safe to take the assets inside would undoubtedly 
be a crime, this situation is far less clear. 
To understand this conceptualization, let’s imagine a one-coin 
cryptocurrency blockchain as a sheet of paper posted in the center of a town. 
This paper can only be written on by a special and secret type of ink (the 
private key) known only by the highest name appearing on the paper. If I, 
improperly and without permission, learn what the special ink is, write my 
name above the previous name, and thereby designate my own secret ink, 
what have I stolen? I haven’t really stolen anything, but I’ve improperly 
commandeered the secret ability to write on the ledger. This ability to write 
on the ledger, conferred by knowledge of the secret ink (private key), has no 
inherent value other than the speculative value society places on it, and thus 
escapes typical definitions of property. It is best described as a trade secret. 
II. OBSTACLES TO PROSECUTING CRYPTOTHEFT 
There are two primary obstacles to effectively enforcing the DTSA 
against cryptocurrency thieves. First, there are statutory and constitutional 
barriers to establishing and enforcing jurisdiction over foreign defendants 
who have never set foot in the United States. This concern is largely 
alleviated by the expansiveness of the DTSA wording and case law 
establishing broad personal jurisdiction under the EEA. Second, there are 
practical challenges to enforcing a judgment over hidden digital assets. 
This technical barrier is reduced by the immediacy of the ex parte 
procedure and can be overcome with sufficient investment in tracking 
down these bad actors. 
A. Extraterritoriality of the DTSA 
The DTSA incorporates the same scope of jurisdiction as the EEA, 
meaning trade secret theft is covered if 
(1) the offender is a natural person who is a citizen or permanent resident 
alien of the United States, or an organization organized under the laws 
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of the United States or a State or political subdivision thereof; or (2) an 
act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United States.92 
 
The challenge in enforcing this Act will arise under clause two, in 
demonstrating that a foreign actor’s computer hacking constitutes an 
action in the United States. 
While few prosecutions test the range of this statute, United States v. Sinovel 
Wind Group Co.93 provides important instruction on the scope of the DTSA. In 
Sinovel, the defendant was charged with pilfering computer source code from a 
competitor and filed a motion to dismiss for improper service and a lack of 
jurisdiction.94 The Seventh Circuit approved of jurisdiction (by declining 
appellate review) when the jurisdictional contacts of the defendant were only 
via a subsidiary located in the United States.95 While the facts are not exactly 
parallel to those of cryptothieves, the idea of exercising international jurisdiction 
to protect the necessary scope of the law is relevant in both contexts. 
To find jurisdiction, the second prong must be interpreted to include a 
foreign entity engaged in offsite hacking.96 Further, there must be 
constitutionally sufficient personal jurisdiction over this statutory 
jurisdiction.97 Statutory subject matter jurisdiction is met when a private key is 
misappropriated from a server in the United States. This is a novel question of 
statutory interpretation, but the situation fits with the wording and the 
intention of Congress, which was to protect domestic secrets from unfair 
foreign behaviors. However, if the hacker targets a server belonging to a United 
States citizen but located overseas, statutory jurisdiction is unlikely. There are 
lesser degrees of interaction with United States servers that may make for a 
difficult decision, but it is sufficient for this Comment to note that the statutory 
standard would likely be met by a foreign attack on an American server. 
Would personal jurisdiction lie over such a foreign attack on an American 
server, and if so, where would that jurisdiction lie? An obvious path around this 
constitutional dilemma is consent: It is unlikely a defendant in a civil suit for 
cryptocurrency trade secret misappropriation would appear before the court, 
even to assert lack of jurisdiction, for fear of apprehension for criminal 
 
92 18 U.S.C. § 1837 (2016). 
93 794 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2015). 
94 Id. at 789. 
95 Id. 
96 See, e.g., Lulu Yilun Chen & Yuji Nakamura, Cryptocurrency Cyber Crime Has Cost Victims Millions 
This Year, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2017, 10:32 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-
24/cyber-criminals-extracting-a-heavy-toll-from-ethereum-advocates [https://perma.cc/Z366-GV5E] 
(describing the various forms of hacking attacks and their relative percentage usages). 
97 There are interesting interactions between this extraterritoriality jurisdiction analysis and 
the ex parte seizure proceeding, as there is a realistic possibility of a court-ordered property seizure 
before the party has had an opportunity to challenge jurisdiction. 
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misconduct. If a defendant did appear to defend himself, “it is worth 
investigating whether jurisdictional roadblocks would prevent meaningful use of 
this statutory tool.”98 Professor Robin Effron describes how modern 
developments in personal jurisdiction have limited the available forums for 
DTSA enforcement. However, Professor Effron points to MacDermid, Inc. v. 
Deiter,99 where the Second Circuit exercised jurisdiction over an Ontario woman 
because she accessed a computer in Connecticut, despite being out of state.100 
The Second Circuit found that such jurisdiction affords due process under 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson101 and Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington102 
because the defendant intentionally directed her actions toward the residents of 
Connecticut.103 She was aware that the servers were located in Connecticut and 
still chose to access them improperly.104 Under this framework, which appears 
to be uncontradicted, jurisdiction over cryptotheft targeted at a known location 
within the United States meets due process requirements. 
A final question arises: would the hacking of a server of unknown location, 
or of a mobile device, meet constitutional requirements? It may be 
straightforward to impute knowledge of location at the time of hacking, given 
the technical sophistication of the wrongdoers. Even if the court is unwilling 
to impute knowledge, jurisdiction exists when “the defendant is not subject 
to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction; and exercising 
jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.”105 
The DTSA and the Constitution thus authorize jurisdiction over a truly 
foreign defendant who knew he was hacking a U.S. server but did not know 
where in the U.S. that server was located. 
The extraterritorial reach of the DTSA makes it a powerful legal tool for 
pursuing cryptocurrency thieves. This expansive power fits with the purpose 
of the Act—to protect the assets of Americans from foreign bad actors. 
B. The Technical Challenges of Finding and Returning Stolen Cryptocurrency 
Practically, it is difficult to track stolen coins, and even more difficult to 
return coins to their rightful owners. Hackers hide behind sophisticated 
layers of deception, and the architecture of cryptocurrency prevents the 
 
98 Robin J. Effron, Trade Secrets, Extraterritoriality, and Jurisdiction, 51 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 765, 773 (2016). 
99 702 F.3d 725 (2d Cir. 2012). 
100 Id. at 776-77. Jurisdiction was proper in part because the Connecticut long arm statute 
“reaches persons outside the state who remotely access computers within the state.” Id. at 729. 
101 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980). 
102 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
103 Macdermid, 702 F.3d at 730. 
104 Id. 
105 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2)(A)–(B). 
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application of administrative oversight. However, recent developments 
demonstrate that both public and private enforcement services are capable of 
overcoming these technical obstacles. 
First, the immediacy of the ex parte seizure procedure may reduce any 
need to combat the redistribution of coins. “[T]he accounts holding the 
pilfered funds can be immediately identified because the virtual coins are 
traceable” and if the “case were a regular bank robbery, identifying the bank 
accounts holding the stolen money would let law enforcement easily return 
the funds to victims.”106 However, unlike bank accounts, suspicious 
cryptowallets are not connected to an identified owner, and are often hidden 
behind multiple IP addresses or proxies. The government has taken steps to 
overcome these hiding techniques. For example, in 2017 “several agencies 
including the FBI invested hundreds of thousands of dollars to team up with 
digital currency analysis company Chainalysis to help track wallet addresses 
of suspicious transactions made on the blockchain.”107 Companies like 
Chainalysis specialize in cracking the algorithms used by criminals to cover 
their tracks. Given adequate technical resources, the government “has the 
capacity to pinpoint and arrest cyber criminals.”108 One way to pinpoint 
criminals is to connect a digital wallet suspected of bad activity to an IP 
address and cross check the address with social media.109 Private individuals 
working through a company like Chainanalysis may be able to do the same, but 
without FBI support this would likely require significant personal resources. 
Alternatively, courts could attempt to force certain non-DLT 
cryptocurrency administrators to rewrite their virtual ledgers to immediately 
return stolen coin. While this is not possible for Bitcoin (a DLT),110 the NEM 
 
106 Tyler Durden, How Do You Hide Stolen Cryptocurrency?, ZEROHEDGE (Feb. 3, 2018), 
https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2018-02-03/how-do-you-hide-stolen-cryptocurrency 
[https://perma.cc/VPP9-LNUD]. 
107 See Amur, supra note 43. 
108 Id. The European Union, through Europol, has established an efficient and resourceful approach 
that should be mirrored in the United States. See Kieran Corcoran, Here’s How Police in Europe Work Together 
Against Cryptocurrency Crime, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 3, 2018, 3:35 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-
european-police-fight-cryptocurrency-crime-2018-2 [https://perma.cc/966X-BNTE] (noting how Europol 
“helps connect the many hundreds of law enforcement organizations across the continent” [with] a 
centralised system by which officers can access information and pool tactics.”). 
109 The power of this technique is evidenced by the arrest of drug trafficker Gal Vallerius. See 
Curt Anderson, Frenchman in US Beard Contest, aka OxyMonster, Pleads Guilty in Drug Case, CHI. SUN-
TIMES (June 12, 2018, 2:32 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/oxymonster-gal-vallerius-beard-
contest-guilty-drug-sales/ [https://perma.cc/3N74-MZBL] (“DEA also discovered that Vallerius had 
Instagram and Twitter accounts. They compared the writing style of ‘OxyMonster’ on the Dream 
Market forum to the writing style of Vallerius on his social media accounts.”). 
110 See Oliver Belin, The Difference Between Blockchain & Distributed Ledger Technology, 
TRADEIX, https://tradeix.com/distributed-ledger-technology/ [https://perma.cc/MUA6-E3EC] (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2018) (explaining how distributed ledger technology is one type of blockchain, and 
discussing how it cannot be rewritten). 
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foundation, for example, has the ability to rewrite its XEM ledger—though 
it has promised its customers it will never do so.111 An order from a federal 
court may force the hand of a blockchain governing foundation. The 
possibility thereof may move the market toward cryptocurrencies willing to 
respond to court orders redressing theft. This market move, however, may 
prove unlikely due to the mass appeal of the untouchability of blockchain, 
especially the Bitcoin-style distributed ledger.112 
Another avenue for returning stolen Bitcoin is by court seizure orders 
against the exchanges or individual wallets where the stolen coins eventually 
appear. However, “[m]any people would have coins—that they innocently 
bought—seized.”113 This may run into problems under the DTSA ex parte 
seizure procedure, which weighs the interests of third parties. On the other 
hand, a universal policy of seizing stolen coins, wherever they lie, may 
encourage cryptocurrency exchanges and investors to be more careful about 
the coins they accept in the first place, thereby decreasing the liquidity of 
stolen cryptoassets and disincentivizing such theft in the first place. 
CONCLUSION 
Cryptotheft has crippling effects on individuals, institutions, and the 
economy. In the last few years, this type of crime has only become more 
pervasive, culminating in the half-billion-dollar heist of the Japanese NEM 
exchange. It has not been a priority of United States law enforcement to 
pursue this brand of crime, likely due to the newness of the technology, the 
technical and extraterritorial difficulty inherent in prosecution, and the lack 
of an on-point legal theory. This Comment addresses these obstacles, 
proposing the DTSA as a novel and ideal tool to prosecute cryptothieves. Not 
only does the Act thoroughly, precisely, and uniquely encompass this difficult-
to-define crime, but it does so in a manner that minimizes the theoretical and 
practical obstacles of civil and criminal suit. 
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